We study a sequential version of the well-known KP-model: Each of n agents has a job that needs to be processed on any of m machines. Agents sequentially select a machine for processing their jobs. The goal of each agent is to minimize the finish time of his machine. We study the corresponding sequential price of anarchy for m identical machines under arbitrary and LPT orders, and suggest insights into the case of two unrelated machines.
Introduction
In this paper we study the following dynamic game. There are n agents, denoted A 1 , . . . , A n , and m machines (or processors). Agent A j has a job that takes p j > 0 time units if processed by any of the machines. Agents sequentially select one of the machines for processing their jobs, starting with A 1 and ending with A n . While choosing a machine, an agent knows the choices made by his predecessors. Once a machine completes processing all the jobs assigned to it, they are (instantaneously) delivered to their agents. The goal of each agent is to have his job delivered at the earliest possible time. We study the corresponding sequential price of anarchy, denoted SPoA, which is the cost-ratio of the worst subgame-perfect equilibria of such games to the solution that minimizes the overall makespan of the system. The formal definitions are given below.
The above model is a sequential version of the well-known KP-model introduced by Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou [9] . They consider a network consisting of m equal-capacity parallel links. There are n agents, each of whom selects a link that will send his own amount of flow; all agents select their links simultaneously. The delay suffered by an agent is proportional to the total flow through the link. The goal of each agent is to minimize the expected delay of his flow, ignoring the effect of his choice on the other players, and the solution concept is Nash Equilibrium. Our scheduling setting is completely analogous to the network setting described above, i.e., jobs stand for traffic flows and machines stand for links; indeed, a large part of the literature following [9] (some of which we describe below) uses that scheduling framework.
Despite its simplicity, this abstract model captures essential features of flow in the Internet -common resources are shared by interacting agents who are assumed to act selfishly. However, it is far from clear what the actual "game" played by the Internet users is; as phrased by Scott Shenker (cited, e.g., in [14] ) "The Internet is an equilibrium; we just have to identify the game." While the KP-model has been widely studied and extended, it seems that in many cases, a more appropriate model should include some form of sequentiality, since agents (or their jobs) may arrive at different times. Consequently, a new line of algorithmic research has been initiated recently, which studies sequential versions of games whose simultaneous counterparts are well-studied. Specifically, in their paper [11] , Leme et al. define the notion of sequential price of anarchy (SPoA) and analyze it in games of Machine Cost Sharing, of Unrelated Machine Scheduling, and of Consensus and Cut. As in our model, in all of their settings the agents are indexed by their "order of arrival" and they choose their actions sequentially, knowing only the choices made by their predecessors. In this paper we focus on the common setting of identical machines and provide exact bounds.
Ω(
√ n) and 2 n , respectively. In [1] , Angelucci et al. SPoA of Isolation Games, and in [5] de Jong et al. study a sequential decision variation of their main model where each player controls a set of machines and wishes to maximize the value of jobs that can be feasibly scheduled on its machines.
Another sequential model that resembles our model is that of crowding games, which was introduced by Milchtaich [13] . In this model, players share a common set of actions and a payoff function which is nonincreasing in the number of players who play the same action. Milchtaich shows that the perfect information sequential game formed by letting the players act in an arbitrary order has a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. Chakrabarty et al. [3] discuss the complexity of computing solutions in such games.
The last model that we mention is not sequential but resembles sequential models. Fiat et al. [7] consider another situation where selfish agents choose their time of transmission in a shared communication media. Transmission is successful only if there is no simultaneous transmission at this time. The main difference between this model and ours is that decisions are made simultaneously and when transmission fails the agent can repeat trying in a later time, whereas in our case decisions are made sequentially and no regret is possible.
Notation
Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, M ≡ {1, . . . , m}. Thus, as we introduced above, the n agents are A j , j ∈ N . We denote the m machines (or processors) by M i , i ∈ M . Agent A j has a job, denoted J j , that takes p j > 0 time units on any of the machines (i.e., they are identical). We denote the list of processing times of all the agents by p := (p 1 , . . . , p n ). Each agent selects one of the machines for processing his job, thus, the action set for each A j is M . In step j of the game, A j observes the current loads on all the machines, i.e., he knows the actions chosen by A 1 , . . . , A j−1 , and chooses a machine for processing his job. Hence, the strategy for A j is a function s j : M j−1 → M . We denote J j ∈ M i if s j = i, i.e., A j chooses M i for his job, and we say that M i is A j 's machine. After all agents chose their machines, i.e., the strategy profile s ≡ (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ M n has been determined, a complete job schedule is obtained. For a given such schedule, we denote by S j and C j the start time and the completion time of J j , respectively (j ∈ N ), and by L i the (final) load on M i , i.e., L i ≡ j:Jj ∈Mi p j ; our schedule will always be clear from the context, so we do not write S j (s), C j (s) etc. We denote the average load byL :
We denote by C max the makespan of the schedule, i.e., C max = max
Once a machine completes processing all the jobs assigned to it, they are (instantaneously) delivered to their agents, hence the cost of A j is the (final) load of his machine, i.e., it is L i satisfying J j ∈ M i . The goal of each agent is to minimize this cost, i.e., to have his job delivered at the earliest possible time. This is an extensive form game, and so it always posses (pure) subgame perfect equilibria, which can easily be calculated by backward induction; see Osborne and Rubinstein [15] (or any other standard textbook on Game Theory) for a comprehensive treatment of these notions. Consequently, we refer to any schedule of the jobs which was obtained by the sequential decision process as a subgame perfect equilibrium, or equilibrium for short. We denote by SP E the set of these equilibria (corresponding to the given game in context).
We denote by C * max the makespan of an optimal schedule, i.e., it is the minimum possible value of the makespan of the system, ideally achieved if a central authority were to schedule the entire set of jobs.
We study the corresponding sequential price of anarchy of the game, denoted SPoA, which is the costratio of the worst subgame-perfect equilibrium to the optimal makespan, that is: Definition 2.1 (Sequential price of anarchy [11] ).
(C max (s) is C max in the schedule corresponding to the strategy profile s ∈ M n .)
SPoA for identical machines
We start with three simple examples with n = 3 agents and m = 2 machines which illustrate some interesting properties.
Motivating examples
In all three examples we use a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 in one of the processing times, so no ties ever occur.
Remark 3.1. We emphasize that the conclusions below are also valid when ǫ = 0, and the bounds obtained are exact and not asymptotic; if ǫ = 0 the obtained solution is just one of several possibilities, so any implementation should include a tie-breaking rule. Thus, we use ǫ in the examples for convenience, but when we refer to SPoA, we substitute ǫ = 0, since this always yields the highest possible value.
Example 3.1. There are n = 3 agents and m = 2 machines. The processing times are p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) = (1, 1 + ǫ, 2). Without loss of generality, assume that A 1 chooses M 1 for his job. Then A 2 chooses M 2 for his job, since he realizes that in this case A 3 will choose M 1 , so A 2 's cost will be L 2 = p 2 = 1 + ǫ, which is best possible. Thus, in the resulting equilibrium,
However, the optimal schedule (with minimum possible makespan) is J 1 , J 2 ∈ M 1 and J 3 ∈ M 2 , achieving C * max = 2 + ǫ. Consequently, the sequential price of anarchy is SPoA = 3 2 (this is obtained by taking ǫ = 0; see Remark 3.1). Figure 1 depicts the game-tree associated with Example 3.1. Vectors at the leaves are the cost vectors (i.e., the loads). The solid lines show the subgame-perfect strategies, and the (unique) path from the root to the leaf corresponding to the black circle is the equilibrium solution. The bold circle corresponds to an optimal solution. The values of C max and C * max are underlined in their corresponding cost vectors. Note that in the above example, each agent acts greedily, i.e., chooses a least loaded machine. However, the next example shows that this strategy need not yield a minimal makespan for that agent. empty), then A 3 will choose M 2 as well, hence A 2 's cost will be 3 − ǫ. However, if he chooses M 1 , A 3 will choose M 2 , and so A 2 's cost will be 2 − ǫ. Thus, in the resulting equilibrium,
It is easily verified that this is also an optimal schedule, i.e., C * max = 2. Consequently, SPoA = 1.
Examples 3.1, 3.2 also demonstrate that an agent may prefer to have his job longer, ceteris paribus: the fact that p 2 is 1 + ǫ (in 3.1) rather than 1 − ǫ (in 3.2) gives A 2 considerable advantage.
Observe that the order of agents crucially affects the outcome: Example 3.3. Consider again Example 3.1 but change the order of p to p = (2, 1, 1 + ǫ). It is easily verified that the resulting equilibrium is J 1 ∈ M 1 , J 2 , J 3 ∈ M 2 , and it forms an optimal schedule as well, yielding C * max = C max = 2 + ǫ; consequently, SPoA = 1.
In Example 3.1, SPoA = 3 2 . We will show that this is the worst possible case for m = 2 (identical) machines.
Analysis
In the following, we show that for m ≥ 2 identical machines, the sequential price of anarchy is at most 2 − 1 m . The argument for the case of two machines is similar to that of Graham for his classical List Scheduling algorithm [8] (see also chapter 2 in [16] ); however, as we will show, this argument does not hold for m > 2 machines.
Lemma 3.1. Let m = 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that the makespan is attained by
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that L 2 < C max − p j . Note that by our choice of A j , all the subsequent agents A j+1 , . . . , A n choose M 2 . If agent A j changes his choice to M 2 , then even if all of A j+1 , . . . , A n also select M 2 , still he will incur a lower cost, namely, L 2 + p j < C max − p j + p j = C max . Therefore, A j would profit by changing his selection, which is a contradiction. 
Consequently, SPoA ≤
We claim that in the resulting schedule, A 2 will schedule his job (with p 2 = 1 − ǫ) on M 1 (starting at S 1 = p 1 = K), and each of the remaining machines M 2 , . . . , M m will be assigned a single job (which belongs to A 3 , . . . , A n ); see Figure 2 . This is true since if A 2 chooses a machine other than M 1 , say M 2 , then each of A 3 , . . . , A n−1 will send his (unit-time) job to an empty machine, and then A n , being the last agent, will send his job (with p n = K + ǫ) to the least loaded machine, which is M 2 . Thus, by choosing M 1 , A 2 's cost is K + 1 − ǫ rather than K + 1. Note thatL = 1 m (2K + m − 1) < K, implying that A 2 's job, which attains the makespan C max = L 1 = K + 1 − ǫ, starts afterL while all other machines except the one with the last (and longest) job, complete at 1, which is earlier thanL. However, as we show in the sequel, the result stated in Theorem 3.1 can be generalized to any number of machines. We describe the key proof technique in a more general form. It claims that any upper bound on the cost of the last agent is immediately a bound on the cost of each other agent as well: Lemma 3.2. Let there be m ≥ 2 identical machines. Suppose that there exists U such that for each j ∈ N , agent A j can choose a machine so that his job's completion time is at most U , regardless of the decisions made by A 1 , . . . , A j−1 . Then, for any j ∈ N , A j can guarantee himself a cost of at most U as well.
Proof. The intuition behind the lemma is that once A j chooses a machine with C j ≤ U , subsequent agents with large jobs will not choose his machine, because if they choose it, and hence make A j pay a high cost, they immediately incur that same cost as well. Formally, let U be as stated in the lemma. We will show that for each j ∈ N , A j can guarantee himself a cost of at most U , by backward induction on the agent's index. For the last agent, A n , this is immediate since his cost is C n , and C n ≤ U by assumption.
Suppose the claim holds for all agents A j+1 , . . . , A n and consider A j . He reasons as follows. By assumption, there is a machine M i which he can choose so that his job's completion time, C j , will not exceed U ; for example, by acting greedily, i.e., choosing a (currently) least loaded machine, this condition must hold. Now, if there are no subsequent agents who choose M i , then A j 's cost will be his job's completion time, C j , and we are done. So assume that some of A j+1 , . . . , A n choose M i as well, so A j 's cost will exceed C j . However, by the induction hypothesis, each of them can choose a machine with (final) load at most U . They choose M i , so their cost will be L i , the (final) load on M i , which satisfies L i ≤ U . Of course, this is A j 's cost as well. Thus, by choosing M i , agent A j can guarantee himself a cost of at most U . Proof. We will first show that for each j ∈ N , if A j acts greedily, then C j ≤ 2 − As in Graham's proof for List Scheduling, C * max is bounded below by LB := max{p max ,L}. We will show that if A j chooses a least loaded machine, then C j ≤ 2 − 1 m LB. For each j ∈ N , this least load is bounded from above by the average load of the first n − 1 scheduled jobs, namely J 1 , . . . , J n−1 . Hence S j ≤ 1 m n−1 k=1 p k . Thus, A j 's job's completion time is bounded from above:
This completes the proof.
Note that the 2 − 1 m bound matches the bound on the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm in Graham's List Scheduling, and the proof resembles his proof. However, the additional step of Lemma 3.2 is required because the agents are selfish, so they may apply a strategy other than the greedy one, that is, a-priori they need not choose a least loaded machine (except for A n , who will always do so). This remark also applies to Theorem 3.3 below.
Imposing order on agents
Suppose that we impose order on the agents, so that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p n . The justification for imposing such order is the intuition that since agents are selfish, "long jobs that arrive last" may create imbalance in the loads, and hence increase the sequential price of anarchy. To this end, we denote the setting in which this order is assumed by (the well-known) LPT rule, i.e., Longest Processing Time first. As we show below, it turns out that imposing such order reduces SPoA from 2 − 1/m to 4/3 − 1/3m; note that this decrease is identical to that of the approximation ratio in Graham's List Scheduling [8] . Proof. The proof idea is similar to that of Theorem 3.2; we will first show that for each j ∈ N , if A j acts greedily, then C j ≤ • 
• Case 2:
We will prove that in this case, C j ≤ C * max . If j ≤ m then this is trivial (because there is an empty machine available for A j ), so assume that j ≥ m + 1. Denote by OP T any fixed optimal schedule (achieving C * max ), and denote by OP T j the corresponding sub-schedule of J 1 , . . . , J j . The LPT rule implies that p k > 1 3 C * max for each k = 1, . . . , j. Therefore, in OP T j , each machine contains at most two jobs. Call J k a long job if p k > C * max − p j and short otherwise, and let r be such that J 1 , . . . , J r are long, i.e.,
note that the assumption j ≥ m + 1 and the LPT rule imply that p j ≤ 1 2 C * max , so such r ≤ j − 1 exists. It follows that in OP T j , each long job is processed on a distinct machine that does not process any other job (otherwise, there exists J i , J q with i ≤ r, q ≤ j on the same machine, so its load is p i + p q ≥ p r + p j > C * max ). Thus, the (remaining) short jobs are processed on at most m − r machines. Since each machine contains at most two jobs, we have:
Now consider our schedule immediately before agent A j chooses the machine for his job. Without loss of generality, we may assume that none of M 1 , . . . , M m−r contains any long job (there may exist more such machines -this happens if and only if some machine processes at least two long jobs). By (1), the number of short jobs other than J j is
Consequently, there exists a machine among M 1 , . . . , M m−r with at most one (short) job, say J l , r + 1 ≤ l ≤ j, so by choosing this machine, A j 's job's completion time will be C j = p l + p j ≤ C * max . This completes the proof.
Two unrelated machines and concluding remarks
As mentioned in the introduction, the best bounds on the worst SPoA for unrelated machines are given by Biló et al. [2] . Specifically, they obtained lower and upper bounds of 2 Ω( √ n) and 2 n , respectively. We believe that these bounds can be further improved.
Denote by p ij the processing time of J j on M i , and we denote the processing times on M i (of all agents) by p i * := (p i1 , p i2 , . . . , p in ), for i ∈ M . Example 4.1. Let n = 3, m = 2, and the processing times are p 1 * = (2ǫ, 1, 2−ǫ) and p 2 * = (2−ǫ, 1+ǫ, 1+ǫ). The equilibrium is J 1 ∈ M 2 and J 2 , J 3 ∈ M 1 ; see Figure 3 . Thus, C max = 3 − ǫ. However, the optimal solution is J 1 , J 2 ∈ M 1 and J 3 ∈ M 2 , C * max = 1 + 2ǫ. Consequently, SPoA = 3.
We believe that Example 4.1 demonstrates the worst possible case for SPoA for two machines. In fact, this example corresponds to a solution of a linear program whose variables are {p ij : i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, 3} and whose objective is to maximize SPoA, for the specific tree structure depicted in Figure 3 . We omit the details. We also considered alternative tree structures and the corresponding SPoA never exceeded 3. This motivates us to propose: Sequential price of anarchy is a new concept and and the current knowledge on related models is limited. There are many interesting open research problems. For example, consider a version in which the information or the computational power of the agents is limited. Note that both "extreme cases" achieve the same sequential price of anarchy of 2 − 1 m : In our model, the agents actually have full information and unlimited computational power, as they may compute the complete game-tree. As we proved, SPoA = 2 − 1 m . The other extreme is when agents act greedily, as they are completely ignorant of the remaining (future) agents' decisions; in this case, SPoA = 2 − 1 m by an argument similar to Graham's. However, we can consider intermediate settings, e.g., agents know the processing times of a fraction of the others, or only the minimum/maximum processing time, or they know all processing times but can only compute the optimal makespan in a fixed number of steps ahead. It is an interesting question whether SPoA will change in these settings. We conjecture that the answer is affirmative.
We believe that the study of the sequential price of anarchy is fruitful for other sequential games motivated from combinatorial optimization problems. We describe two suggestions:
Sequential Set Cover. The input consists of a set system, where the agents correspond to items. Agents sequentially select sets -each agent chooses a set that covers his item. The goal of each agent is to choose a set such that in the final solution, his item is covered by the least number of sets (chosen by other agents). In contrast, an optimal solution is defined as one in which the average number of sets per item is minimum. Note that this objective is equivalent to a minimum number of sets, which is the objective of the ordinary Set Cover problem.
Sequential Bin Packing. The input consists of items, and their volumes, each volume is at most 1. Again, agents correspond to items. Agents sequentially select bins -each agent chooses a bin in which his item can fit (this may be an existing bin or a new one). The goal of each agent is to choose a bin such that in the final solution, the total number (or volume) of items in his bin is maximum. In contrast, an optimal solution is defined as one in which the average number of items per bin is maximum. Note that this objective is equivalent to a minimum number of bins, which is the objective of the ordinary Bin Packing problem.
A.1 Dynamic programming algorithm
Let the state vector be the load vector L = (L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L m ), meaning that upon arrival of an agent, the load already assigned to machine M i is L i , i ∈ M . Denote by F i j (L) the final load of M i when A j arrives at state L (i ∈ M, j ∈ N ). Note that L i ∈ {0, . . . , j−1 k=1 p ik }. Let x j (L) be a variable that takes value i when M i is selected by A j given state L.
For given L and p ij , denote the vector (L 1 , . . . , L i−1 , L i + p ij , L i+1 , . . . , L m ) by L ⊕ p ij . The following is a dynamic programming algorithm:
• Define F i n+1 (L) = L i for all i ∈ M , for any L ∈ R m .
• for j = n, n − 1, . . . , 1:
-let r := argmin q∈M F q j+1 (L ⊕ p qj ) (ties broken arbitrarily). -x j (L) := r. Note that C * max = max i∈M F i 1 (0, . . . , 0). The solution is constructed recursively. It can be computed in pseudopolynomial time for fixed m. It is a little simpler for identical machines. For example, consider the special case with two identical machines. In this case, p 1j = p 2j = p j for every j ∈ N . Denote by F i j (h) the final load of M i , i = 1, 2, if upon arrival of A j , the load currently assigned to M 1 is h. Then the algorithm is:
• Define F 1 n+1 (h) = h, F 2 n+1 (h) = n j=1 p j − h, for any h ∈ R.
if 
A.2 A reaching algorithm
An alternative reaching algorithm (see, e.g., the book [6] ) is more efficient when n is small. First define for every vertex v of the game-tree the n-dimensional vector L(v) of costs (final loads) of the agents. Let V (1) ⊆ V denote the set of leaves in this tree. Note that the minimum makespan is C * max = min
Now recursively, in decreasing levels of the tree, compute the vector L corresponding to every node in level j (corresponding to a decision made by agent A j ). Specifically, let L ′ and L ′′ be the cost vectors of its two sons in level
, and L = L ′′ otherwise. Note that the makespan (obtained by the sequential decision process) is C max = max j∈N L(r) j , where L(r) is the cost vector at the root r.
